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THESES
1. The European Union’s strategic concept of the Southern Gas 
Corridor as a gas supply route independent from transit states 
became a thing of the past when the Nabucco project was 
abandoned in 2012. The Southern Gas Corridor is currently 
a system of three complementary gas pipeline projects, each at 
a different stage of implementation, controlled by Azerbaijan 
and Turkey. These projects allow above all the advancement of 
Azerbaijan’s vital interests, namely the launch of gas exports 
to Turkey and the EU. Turkey views the Southern Gas Corri-
dor as one of the projects which improve its energy security 
and which might help it become a gas hub. In turn, for the EU, 
the corridor in its present shape as determined by Baku and 
Ankara is of marginal significance – it will not help guaran-
tee energy security to the EU but is nevertheless essential for 
Southern European countries (e.g. Bulgaria and Greece). 
2. Despite the weakness of the currently implemented Southern 
Gas Corridor, the crisis in relations with Russia over Ukraine 
has made it more important for the EU. Brussels again sees 
the corridor as an opportunity for a genuine diversification of 
gas supplies and for strengthening its position in dealing with 
Russia. This has stimulated the EU’s activity, even though its 
means of influence on the corridor are slender. In turn, Rus-
sia, partly as a consequence of the Ukrainian crisis, has al-
tered the map of energy projects in the Black Sea region, in-
viting Turkey and Greece to participate in the Turkish Stream 
gas pipeline project. Russia’s moves are part of a greater game 
with the West, yet at the same time they complicate the im-
plementation of the Southern Gas Corridor, which in some re-
spects is becoming another sphere of the geopolitical conflict 
between Russia and the West. 
3. The changing circumstances bring new challenges to Azer-
baijan, for which the Southern Gas Corridor is a pillar of 
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economic development and an element for strengthening the 
country’s security. It is Baku’s determination that made the 
launch of the corridor’s construction possible. However, Baku 
has been unable to turn it into a purely commercial project. 
Therefore, Azerbaijan fears that the Southern Gas Corridor 
may suffer from the rivalry between the EU and Russia, and 
has been carefully manoeuvring between the two so as not to 
offend either of them. In turn, Turkey and Greece, capitalising 
on the fact that their participation is essential for the imple-
mentation of both the Southern Gas Corridor and the Turkish 
Stream, have been strengthening their position with regard 
to the rivalling EU and Russia sides and also Azerbaijan, and 
they are demanding tangible economic benefits as a result. 
4. It is unclear what the final outline of the corridor will be due 
to the changing context in which its creation is being carried 
out. The past three years have shown the vast and complex 
dynamics affecting the outcomes of this project’s implemen-
tation: Azerbaijan’s emancipation and its limitations, the 
strength of Ankara’s ambitions, Moscow’s determination to 
reintegrate the post-Soviet area (also using military means) 
which, whatever the final outcome (in Ukraine) will be, al-
ready has a strong impact on the politics of the former Soviet 
republics and the strength of the rivalry between Russia and 
the EU, as well as the possibility of rapid changes (see the 
Ukrainian crisis). All these factors are opening up a new stage 
in the game of the Southern Gas Corridor, with a great number 
of variables in play. 
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INTRODUCTION
The communications announced by the European Commission in 
the past few months, outlining the EU’s energy strategy (May 2014 
and February 2015) and the European Commission’s diplomatic 
activity, suggest that interest in the Southern Gas Corridor pro-
ject has revived. This is happening after two years of essentially 
disregarding this project – Brussels’ interest in the Southern Gas 
Corridor waned significantly after the Nabucco project was aban-
doned in 2012. It is the continuing crisis in relations with Russia 
over Ukraine that has mobilised the EU to revise its energy policy 
once again and to grant a higher priority to the Southern Gas Cor-
ridor. Another factor which has contributed to this was the form-
ing of the new European Commission, which has made active dip-
lomatic and political efforts to back this project. 
The Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP), which is almost ex-
clusively an Azerbaijani-Turkish route (in terms of gas supplies, 
infrastructure ownership, financing manner and political con-
trol of the project) and in which Western firms and the EU itself 
have only a symbolic share, is currently the most important for 
the Southern Gas Corridor. The Southern Gas Corridor project en-
tered the implementation phase on 20 September 2014. Regard-
less of this, its final shape, significance and implementation per-
spectives are still unclear, which is mainly due to the change in 
political circumstances and the adjustment of plans concerning 
new energy projects in the region (Moscow replaced the South 
Stream project with a new route known as Turkish Stream). These 
changes in turn are a consequence of a deep crisis in relations be-
tween Russia and the West over the Ukrainian crisis. 
This text is intended to determine what the Southern Gas Corridor 
is today, what its significance is for the EU, Azerbaijan and Tur-
key, and which factors might be essential for the implementation 
of this project. Another goal of this text is to outline the challeng-
es posed by the changing circumstances of the implementation of 
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the Southern Gas Corridor to its main promoters: Azerbaijan and 
Turkey. However, it is not intended as an analysis of the impact 
of potential supplies of Azerbaijani gas to individual European 
countries and does not consider the possible implementation of 
the Turkish Stream route nor the development of relations be-
tween Russia and the EU. Despite progress made in the nuclear 
negotiations with Iran, supplies of Iranian gas may be feasible 
only in the long term due to the lack of transport and production 
infrastructure. Due to this, Iran is not a subject of this analysis. 
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I. THE gENESIS aND THE EvOlUTION Of THE 
EU’S SOUTHERN gaS CORRIDOR CONCEpT 
The Southern Gas Corridor is a project aimed at diversifying the 
routes and sources of gas supplies to the European Union. It was 
first announced in the Second Strategic Energy Review in 20081. 
Its emergence was a consequence of several processes: the in-
creasing significance of the energy security issue following the 
Russian-Ukrainian crisis in 2006, the genuine interest shown by 
Western companies in gas supplies from the Caspian region (from 
Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq and Turkmenistan – especially since the 
president of this country changed in late 2006/early 2007) and the 
longstanding US efforts to promote its geopolitical vision of build-
ing an East-West corridor running from Central Asia through the 
Caucasus and Turkey to Europe.
The EU’s concept of the Southern Gas Corridor was based on pre-
existing projects of gas pipelines: the planned Nabucco gas pipe-
line, the Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) route and the Trans-Adriatic 
Pipeline (TAP) were adopted as its elements. The corridor was 
intended to connect the EU with gas deposits located in its close 
neighbourhood where Western firms were the investors. In the 
initial phase, this concerned mainly the Azerbaijani Shah Deniz 
gas field, in which investments were held at that time, for exam-
ple, by BP, Total, Statoil and Devon Energy.
In political terms, the corridor was intended to help the EU bring 
the Caucasus closer to the West. It was being created in paral-
lel with the EU’s new programme aimed at co-operation with its 
‘Eastern Neighbourhood’, i.e. the Eastern Partnership, which was 
announced in May 20092. It was also intended at creating stronger 
1 Second Strategic Energy Review – An EU Energy Security and Soli-
darity Action Plan, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=COM:2008:0781:FIN:EN:PDF
2 The EP programme replaced the European Neighbourhood Policy, which was 
first presented in 2003. 
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bonds between Turkey and the EU after the two parties had em-
barked on accession talks in 2005. 
The European Commission planned that, in the optimal version, 
the corridor would be a gas supply line controlled by Western 
firms (infrastructure owners) and functioning according to EU 
law. According to this vision, the EU would be able to intercon-
nect gas from various sources (Iran, Iraq and Turkmenistan) to 
this supply line in an unrestricted manner. Turkey’s role was lim-
ited to that of a transit country, and Azerbaijan’s to that of a sup-
plier of gas necessary at the first stage of the corridor’s operation. 
Thus, these two countries were considered as passive rather than 
active agents in contacts with the EU. It was Brussels who deter-
mined the outline of the corridor’s form, hoping that it would lead 
to a significant diversification of supplies and would improve the 
energy security of Southern and Central European countries. 
From Baku’s and Ankara’s point of view, Brussels did not respect 
their interests and promoted the Nabucco, which was the only one 
to offer the opportunity of carrying out the optimal (as seen by 
the EU) vision of the corridor. 
Since the Nabucco gas pipeline project was cancelled in 20123, the 
EU lost interest in the Southern Gas Corridor, and the European 
Commission in fact discontinued work on this project. Regardless 
of this, Azerbaijan and Turkey continued their efforts to make the 
Southern Gas Corridor a reality, replacing the Nabucco project 
with the TANAP route. 
As a consequence of the crisis in relations between the EU and 
Russia over Ukraine (Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 
2014 being the breakthrough point), the EU resumed the topic of 
diversification of supplies, partly through restoring significance 
3 Aleksandra Jarosiewicz, Southern Gas Corridor managed by Azerbaijan 
and Turkey, OSW Commentary, 18 July 2012, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/osw-commentary/2012-07-18/southern-gas-corridor-managed-
azerbaijan-and-turkey
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to the former idea of diversifying supplies using the Southern 
Gas Corridor. At present, according to official EU’s declarations, 
the increasingly complicated political situation once again makes 
diversification of energy supply routes and sources an important 
issue, and the corridor project is viewed as offering the opportu-
nity for the construction of new gas pipeline infrastructure that 
will lessen the dependence on Russian gas supplies. Its growing 
significance is reflected in the provisions of EU documents, for in-
stance, the communication on the Energy Union4 (announced on 
25 February 2015) and the new European Commission’s diplomatic 
and political activity. This activity has included the participation 
of Maroš Šefčovič, the vice president of the European Commis-
sion, in the first meeting of the Southern Gas Corridor Advisory 
Board, i.e. the advisory body tasked with supporting the imple-
mentation of the Southern Gas Corridor, appointed by Baku5, and 
the European Commission’s efforts to facilitate co-operation be-
tween Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Turkey to enable supplies 
of Turkmen gas to the EU. The results of these moves include the 
meeting of ministers from Turkey, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan 
and the vice president of the European Commission in Ashgabat 
and the passing of a multilateral declaration on energy co-oper-
ation on 1 May 20156. The parties agreed, for instance, on the ap-
pointment of a working group at the vice ministerial level and 
the preparation of a framework agreement on gas supplies from 
Turkmenistan to the EU. The European Commission has also 
4 http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/energy-union/index_en.htm, the European 
Commission’s communication was accepted by the European Council on 19-
20 March 2015 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-
council/2015/03/19-20/. In addition to the Southern Gas Corridor, the EU 
pointed to the need to develop LNG infrastructure and build gas intercon-
nectors inside the EU. 
Another document proving that the Southern Gas Corridor is a key project, 
was the European Commission’s communication announced in May 2014, 
presenting the EU’s new energy strategy, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0330&qid=1407855611566
5 http://en.apa.az/xeber_socar_announces_details_of_joint_declara_223611.html
6 http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/sefcovic/announcements/ash-
gabat-declaration_en
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made attempts to establish closer co-operation with Turkey, the 
most important transit country, one consequence of which is the 
initiation of a platform for energy dialogue between Ankara and 
Brussels at the ministerial level7. 
The European Commission’s moves concerning the Southern Gas 
Corridor have been inspired by concerns about energy security, 
but the implementation of this project also has a political mean-
ing. From Moscow’s point of view, the European Commission’s ac-
tivity in the post-Soviet area violates the exclusive Russian zone 
of interest, and this is happening at the time of a serious crisis 
concerning Ukraine. 
7 High Level Energy Dialogue,  http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/
arias-canete/announcements/eu-turkey-high-level-energy-dialogue-and-
strategic-energy-cooperation_en
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II. THE CORRIDOR TODay: NEw INfRaSTRUCTURE 
OwNERS aND NEw RUlES Of OpERaTION
What is today referred to as the Southern Gas Corridor is in fact 
primarily an Azerbaijani-Turkish route consisting of three com-
plementary gas pipeline projects at different stages of develop-
ment. Two of them, i.e. TANAP and the gas pipeline which runs 
in parallel to the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum route, are controlled by 
Azerbaijan and to a lesser extent by Turkey. 
The present shape of planned and implemented infra-
structure for gas exports from azerbaijan to the EU 
 – a gas pipeline which runs parallel to the existing Baku-
-Tbilisi-Erzurum route (BTE, also referred to as the South 
Caucasus gas pipeline), its shareholder is a consortium ope-
rating on the Shah Deniz gas field formed by: BP (28.8%), 
TPAO (19%), SOCAR (16.7%), Petronas (15.5%), LUKoil (10%) 
and Iran’s NICO (10%). The sole owner of the Turkish sec-
tion of this gas pipeline is Turkey’s BOTAS. To increase the 
route’s annual transport capacity from the present level of 
8 billion m3 to 25 billion m3 of gas, it is planned to build a pa-
rallel section with a transport capacity of 17 billion m3 pf 
gas. Its estimated construction cost is US$ 3 billion and will 
be incurred solely by Azerbaijan. Baku will also have total 
control of this route8. 
The construction of a gas pipeline running in parallel to 
BTE was launched on 20 September 2014, which was an-
nounced by Azerbaijan as, the launch of work on the South-
ern Gas Corridor. Even though no representatives of the 
European Commission were present at the ceremony, this 
was positively received by the European Union. 
8 http://www.contact.az/docs/2013/Economics&Finance/012300025666en.
htm#.VBRYsYVa-Iw
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 – the TaNap (Trans-anatolian) gas pipeline, whose sha-
reholders are: SOCAR (58%), Turkey’s BOTAS (30%) and 
Britain’s BP (12%). During the first stage (2021; the constru-
ction will end in 2019), the route’s annual transport capaci-
ty will be 16 billion m3 of gas, to ultimately reach the level 
of 32 billion m3 in 2026. The estimated construction cost 
of the pipeline, running from the Turkish-Georgian bor-
der to the Turkish-Greek border, is around US$ 11 billion. 
According to assurancesthe cost will be incurred solely by 
the project’s shareholders in proportion to their respective 
shares held – Azerbaijan has allocated for this purpose part 
of its incomes deposited in the SOFAZ Oil Fund. Contrary 
to Azerbaijan’s expectations, Statoil and Total have not de-
cided to join the shareholders of this project. The constru-
ction work began in Kars in Turkey in March 2015. 
 – Tap (Trans-adriatic pipeline) – its shareholders are: BP 
(20%), SOCAR (20%), Statoil (20%), Fluxys (19%), Enagas (16%) 
and Switzerland’s Axpo (5%). Total and E.On withdrew from 
this project. The route’s annual transport capacity will reach 
between 10 billion m3 of gas and 23 billion m3 as a maximum. 
The estimated construction cost is around US$ 2 billion. 
The gas pipeline’s construction is expected to begin in 2016. 
The TAP consortium hopes to receive loans for the imple-
mentation of this project – it has signed letters of intent, for 
example, with the EBRD and the EIB. It has also entered into 
a number of agreements with West Balkan gas firms and 
states in order to connect the planned route with the Ionian 
Adriatic Pipeline currently under construction. This would 
make it possible to supply Azerbaijani gas to Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Montenegro, Slovenia and Croatia.
Since the planned infrastructure has changed (Nabucco has been 
replaced with the planned TANAP route), the rules of gas trans-
port have also changed. Gas transit via TANAP will be controlled 
by the project’s shareholders (i.e. the company referred to as the 
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TANAP Project Entity) – and thus at present by Azerbaijan and 
Turkey, holding the greatest shares – 58% and 30% respectively9. 
The provisions of the Turkish-Azerbaijani agreement of 2012 reg-
ulate the mutual relations of TANAP shareholders and offer them 
the opportunity to block each other. On the one hand, the fact that 
Baku holds a 58% stake lets it decide as regards gas supplies from 
other producers, i.e. Baku may impede or even block the transit 
of non-Azerbaijani gas via TANAP. On the other hand, the agree-
ment provides for transit of only 10 billion m3 of Azerbaijani gas 
to the EU. This means that Azerbaijan is forced to offer to Turkish 
consumers all quantities in excess of this volume of gas sent via 
TANAP. Only when Turkey refuses to buy Azerbaijani gas will it 
be possible to transport it to other markets10. 
If TANAP’s annual transport capacity is to be increased above 
32 billion m3 of gas, an additional intergovernmental agreement 
will have to be signed by Turkey and Azerbaijan. Turkey also de-
fines the legal framework of the project’s implementation and op-
eration of the gas pipeline, such as the tax rates, for example.11 
Such provisions mean that the parties are able to block one an-
other. It is Turkey who will decide on what may happen with ad-
ditional Azerbaijani gas (above the limit of 10 billion m3), while 
Azerbaijan can block other suppliers’ access to TANAP – holding 
a 58% stake in the project, it can decide on the route’s transport 
capacity and tariff rates12. 
9 Pursuant to the intergovernmental Azerbaijani-Turkish agreement, Azer-
baijan will hold at least 51% of the shares. Cf. article 7.4 of the agreement 
of June 2012, which is available here: http://www.tanap.com/content/file/
TANAPIGA.pdf 
10 Article 7.6 of the aforementioned agreement.
11 http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/NG-82.pdf
12 According to article 7.4 of the aforementioned agreement, TANAP Project 
Entity has the right to use the gas pipeline’s capacity in its sole discretion, 
make it available to third parties and set the transport tariffs. At the same 
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Thus, for the firms engaged in Azerbaijan13 the emergence of 
TANAP, which is dominated by Azerbaijan and Turkey, will mean 
the need to agree the rules of transit via this route with Baku and 
Ankara (the main shareholders). The same concerns the possible 
transport of gas via this route from sources other than Azerbai-
jan, for example from Iran, Iraq or Turkmenistan – either they 
will receive consent from Azerbaijan, the majority shareholder 
in TANAP, or they will be forced to build new infrastructure and 
negotiate transit issues with Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey is not 
a member of the Energy Community, and EU directives do not ap-
ply to it – therefore it may shape its transit policy as it sees fit. 
The role of the European Union in the infrastructure designed 
this way has been reduced to that of a gas consumer. 
time TANAP Project Entity only has the obligation to inform the Ministry of 
Energy and Natural Resources of the Republic of Turkey of these moves. 
13 At other gas fields than Shah Deniz 2, which is the raw material base for 
TANAP and has been granted preferential rules of access to this pipeline. 
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III. THE SIgNIfICaNCE Of THE SOUTHERN gaS 
CORRIDOR fOR THE ENERgy SECTOR 
The significance of the Southern Gas Corridor which is currently 
under construction, i.e. the supply route running from Azerbai-
jan via Turkey to Europe, where the TANAP gas pipeline is the 
most important element, varies in the case of each of the entities 
interested in it and depends on the functions they perform in this 
project: consumer, supplier and transit country. The perception of 
the project by individual entities is also affected by the size of the 
built and planned infrastructure. 
1. Azerbaijan – the life line 
The Azerbaijani-Turkish gas pipeline currently under construc-
tion has the greatest significance for azerbaijan. From Baku’s 
point of view, this project enables gas exports independently from 
Russia to the Turkish and European markets. TANAP will be an 
addition to the already existing routes: the gas pipelines running 
to Turkey (BTE), Iran and to Russia, via which Azerbaijan import-
ed Russian gas until 2007. 
The new gas pipeline will play the leading role in the transport 
of Azerbaijani gas, i.e. it will provide the route for around 70% of 
Azerbaijan’s gas exports (around 25% will be supplied to the BTE 
route). Thus, like the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline for the oil 
sector, TANAP has a fundamental significance for the develop-
ment of the gas sector in Azerbaijan. In turn, given the continu-
ously falling oil output, gas production is essential for the country 
to maintain economic and political stability. If the construction of 
TANAP is unsuccessful, Azerbaijan will have no other choice but 
to export gas to its previous recipients: Russia or Iran, or to Tur-
key at best. A possible failure of the plans to build the gas pipeline 
could also lead to withholding investments in the development of 
the gas sector. Given the falling oil output and problems related 
to the need for genuine diversification and modernisation of the 
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economy, this would result in economic and political problems, 
posing a threat to a country governed by an authoritarian regime. 
All the aforementioned factors mean that TANAP holds a similar 
strategic importance for Azerbaijan as the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan 
oil pipeline which was built in 2006. It is a way to lessen the coun-
try’s dependence on Russia, strengthen co-operation with Turkey 
(co-dependencies) and generate income from the development 
of the energy sector14. Traditionally, the development of oil and 
gas export routes independently from Russia and in co-operation 
with the West has been the pillar of the policy of an independent 
Azerbaijan, on which the country’s economic development and se-
curity has been based. 
Forecast of gas exports from Azerbaijan via individual routes 
(in billions of m3)
Route
Transport 
volume in 
2014 
Transport 
volume in 
2020 
Transport 
volume in 
2030 
annual 
transport 
capacity 
(in billion 
m3 of gas)
Azerbaijan-
Russia 0.2 1 1
5 (op-
erational; 
technical 
– 13)
Azerbaijan-Iran 
(swap to 
Nakhchivan)
0.4 0.5 0.5 10
BTE: to Georgia
To Turkey
1.4
6.6
1.4
6.6
1.4
6.6 8
14 In symbolic terms, this strategic significance of the Southern Gas Corridor was 
manifested through the choice of the date on which work on the first stage of 
this project commenced (i.e. the construction of the gas pipeline running in 
parallel to BTE) – 20 September 2014, i.e. the twentieth anniversary of Azer-
baijan’s signing the ‘contract of the century’ concerning the development of 
the country’s largest oil field (Azeri–Chirag–Guneshli) by Western firms. 
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
8/
20
15
19
Route
Transport 
volume in 
2014 
Transport 
volume in 
2020 
Transport 
volume in 
2030 
annual 
transport 
capacity 
(in billion 
m3 of gas)
TANAP - 16 26 16 in 2021 32 in 2026 
Total 8.6 25.5 35.5 39 in 2021 49 in 2026 
TANAP’s share 
in total exports 
from Azerbai-
jan
0 41% 73%
2. Turkey – TANAP as a stage in the construction of a gas hub 
For Turkey, which heavily relies on Russian gas supplies (they ac-
count for over 60% of its imports), the construction of TANAP is 
a way to diversify the routes and sources of its gas supplies, and is 
expected to improve its energy security. Ankara has guaranteed 
itself supplies of 6 billion m3 of gas from Azerbaijan (transported 
via TANAP) and has opened up the way to further negotiations 
concerning gas supplies from this country. 
TANAP and co-operation with Azerbaijan also allow Turkey to put 
into practice a number of the key guidelines of its energy strategy, 
i.e. gaining access to gas fields (Turkey’s TPAO has increased its 
share in Shah Deniz from 9% to 19%) and the development of gas 
infrastructure in its territory (Turkey’s BOTAS has a 30% stake in 
the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline). 
Turkey is not just a transit state in the case of TANAP (unlike 
Nabucco). Ankara has a greater access to raw material sources 
and owns transport infrastructure, can buy additional volumes of 
gas from Azerbaijan, and can also to a limited extent co-decide on 
its transit using the infrastructure currently under construction. 
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All this offers Turkey a greater opportunity to become a gas hub 
(an autonomous gas disposer) for the EU15. Even though it is still 
an open question whether this will be a transport or a trading hub 
– the latter being the ultimate goal of the Turkish energy policy. 
TANAP is also an instrument used by Ankara in the course of 
implementing its policy with regard to other entities. Turkey has 
been engaged in active talks with Turkmenistan regarding gas 
supplies, even though it cannot decide on gas transit using this 
route. 
3. The EU – a drop in the ocean of needs 
The Southern Gas Corridor in the TANAP version is of margin-
al significance for the energy sector of the EU as a whole. The 
volumes of gas export to Europe declared by Azerbaijan (10 bil-
lion m3, of which 8 billion m3 will be supplied to Italy and 2 bil-
lion m3 will be divided between Greece and Bulgaria) will not have 
any major impact on improving the energy security of the EU as 
a whole, since this quantity will cover only around 2% of the pre-
sent demand level. 
On the other hand, in the case of individual countries, i.e. Greece 
and Bulgaria, and to a lesser extent Italy, supplies from Azerbaijan 
15 Turkey’s strategic goal is to build a regional natural gas exchange in its terri-
tory, which would result in a reduction of gas prices for Turkish consumers 
and allow Ankara to maximise the benefits offered by the country’s strategic 
location. Gas from Turkey would be supplied to the EU not so much as part of 
transit but rather as a product bought from the Turkish exchange. To make 
this strategy a reality, Ankara has been engaged in an active search for addi-
tional sources of natural gas (Iraqi Kurdistan, Israel and Iran). However, giv-
en the deteriorating political situation in the region, it will take long before 
these supplies will become possible (one exception is Iran, where the politi-
cal situation is improving, but the chances of increasing supplies to Turkey 
from the underinvested Iranian gas fields are still low). For more on Turkey’s 
plans and conditions of their implementation, cf. Gulmira Rzayeva, Natural 
Gas in the Turkish Domestic Energy Market: policies and challenges, Oxford 
2014, http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/
NG-82.pdf 
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will cause a real diversification of gas supply routes and sourc-
es. Russian gas accounts for between 70% and 100% of Greek and 
Bulgarian gas imports. Therefore, gas supplies from Azerbaijan 
would tangibly improve their energy security. 
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Iv. UkRaINE CaSTS a SHaDOw OvER THE 
SOUTHERN gaS CORRIDOR 
The Southern Gas Corridor in the TANAP version is a small-scale 
project aimed above all at implementing the interests of Baku, i.e. 
transporting Azerbaijani gas. Principally, it offers no room for gas 
supplies from other sources. The small scale of this gas pipeline 
is fully satisfactory to Baku, which has proven that it is ready to 
incur the costs of its implementation. 
It also appeared that TANAP was acceptable to Russia, which – 
unlike the case with Nabucco – until recently did not view it as 
serious competition for its export plans and refrained from criti-
cism of it. The possibility that Azerbaijan and Russia entered into 
a gentlemen’s agreement in 2012 cannot be ruled out, i.e. that Baku 
gave up Nabucco and chose the TAP route (Italian market) in or-
der to avoid competing with Gazprom in the Central European gas 
markets.
The circumstances of the implementation of the gas pipeline run-
ning from Azerbaijan to the EU changed as the crisis between the 
West and Russia over the Ukrainian conflict became more serious. 
It undermined the trust and the existing foundations of co-oper-
ation between the EU and Russia, made Russia even more resist-
ant to gas transit via Ukraine and, in geopolitical terms, triggered 
a new strife between Russia and the West. In the post-Soviet area, 
the Ukrainian crisis has aggravated concerns about the intentions 
of Moscow’s new aggressive reintegration policy. 
In the context of the energy sector, the Ukrainian conflict initially 
led to a breakdown of the dialogue between Moscow and Brus-
sels (which, for example, completely halted the work on the South 
Stream route which was intended to run from Russia via the Black 
Sea to Bulgaria and further on to other European countries), and 
then to changes in the EU’s and Russia’s energy policies. These in-
clude the replacement of South Stream with Turkish Stream by 
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Moscow and the European Commission’s renewed support for the 
Southern Gas Corridor at the diplomatic and political level, since 
it is viewed as a route for supplies not only from Azerbaijan but 
also from Turkmenistan (disregarding genuine possibilities, Rus-
sia’s resistance and the need to compete with China). 
Ukraine has also indirectly influenced the political and energy 
calculations of the actors imvolved in the Southern Gas Corridor, 
and has also added to its political weight. 
1. Turkish Stream instead of South Stream – the Russian 
gas gambit 
Russia’s decision to reject South Stream, a project it had been 
pushing through for years, and to replace it with the idea of build-
ing a gas pipeline running through the Black Sea and Turkey to 
the Greek border (using the Turkish Stream and the still impre-
cise idea of a gas hub in Turkey) has completely disproved the as-
sumptions on which the region’s energy policy had been based. 
These included the belief that Russia is determined to build South 
Stream and is interested in gaining access to the end user in the 
EU. Meanwhile, Moscow has shown that it can make attempts to 
replace the lack of interaction with the EU and Ukraine (in fact 
their refusal to accept Moscow’s conditions) with co-operation 
with Turkey16. 
Turkish Stream 
The proposal to build a gas pipeline known as Turkish Stream 
was made on 1 December 2014 during a visit by the Russian 
president Vladimir Putin to Ankara. The pipeline’s route has 
not been set precisely as yet. According to initial information, 
16 For more on changes in Russia’s policy and the rational reasons for its with-
drawal from the South Stream project, see: https://www.oxfordenergy.
org/2015/01/cancellation-south-stream-signal-fundamental-reorientation-
russian-gas-export-policy/
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Turkish Stream will run parallel to the planned South Stream 
route and turn southwards in the direction of Turkey before 
entering Bulgaria’s territorial waters (cf. map). 
The gas pipeline’s final declared capacity is expected to reach 
63 billion m3 (the same as in the case of South Stream). A sec-
tion with a transport capacity of 16 billion m3 will be built in 
the first stage (Gazprom has promised to bring it into operation 
in 2016). This would allow Russia to cease sending gas via the 
Ukrainian-Balkan pipeline to Turkey. Russia has also offered 
to create a gas hub in Turkey as part of Turkish Stream, with-
out however giving any details of what it would be like (apart 
form the general information that around 47-49 billion m3 
of gas would be supplied to it). President Putin suggested in 
February this year that Turkish Stream could be extended to 
Baumgarten (using the Nabucco route). It has not been agreed 
who will finance the gas pipeline. It is also unclear yet which 
firms will be chosen as subcontractors (Russia has promoted 
Gazprom Russkaya). Another known fact is that the maritime 
section of the gas pipeline will be built by Saipem. 
Since Turkish Stream was announced, Russia has made efforts 
to create the impression that progress has been made in work 
concerning the pipeline. Blatant grandstanding, such as the 
common helicopter flight of Gazprom’s head and the Turkish 
energy minister along the planned route of the gas pipeline 
(which has still not been agreed) in February this year, and the 
announcement in May that work on the construction of this 
route had begun even though the agreement with Turkey had 
not been signed, have been employed for this purpose.
Russia’s moves (Turkish Stream) demonstrate its desire to regain 
the strategic initiative in relations with Turkey and Southern Eu-
ropean countries (above all, Greece) at the expense of the EU. Rus-
sia’s proposals have been positively received in Ankara, which itself 
wants to be treated more on equal terms in contacts with the EU and 
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to strengthen its role in the region. Co-operation with Russia helps 
Ankara achieve these goals. Thus, Ankara’s desires coincide with 
Russia’s expectations, which hopes to remove Turkey from the orbit 
of Western influence, offering it co-creation of energy routes run-
ning to the EU. This forms strong foundations for building closer 
relations between these two countries. Moscow’s negotiating posi-
tion will thus become stronger during the efforts to set a new order 
of relations with the EU. Russia wants to maintain its dominant po-
sition in gas supplies to Southern Europe or to take over control of 
supplies from its competitors (the vague idea of creating a gas hub 
in Turkey is intended to serve this purpose). 
Whatever the actual shape Turkish Stream will take, and regard-
less of Russia’s determination and ability to carry out this project, 
the fact alone that the idea of building a gas pipeline running from 
Russia to Turkey emerged, has changed the situation of TANAP 
and the energy calculations of the countries located in the Black 
Sea region.
Firstly, one tangible consequence of Russia’s decision is the emer-
gence of competition between Turkish Stream and the gas pipe-
line running from Azerbaijan via Turkey to the EU. Both projects 
run through Turkey and assume that the Turkish-Greek or the 
Turkish-Bulgarian border will be the point of entry to the EU. 
Thus, Baku’s hopes that it will avoid competing with Russian gas 
on the European market have deflated17 – even though contracts 
with consumers in the EU have been signed, Azerbaijan fears that 
Russia will use Turkish Stream to maintain its dominant position 
on the Greek and Bulgarian markets, and will not let Azerbaijani 
gas be supplied to these markets. Competition will intensify, if 
TANAP’s capacity increases18. 
17 It is emphasised in Azerbaijan’s official narrative that TANAP has no chance 
of undermining Russia’s position on the EU market.
18 Oficially, Baku denies that competition is possible between TANAP and Turk-
ish Stream, emphasising that Azerbaijan has signed contracts with gas re-
cipients. However, in practice, Azerbaijan’s concerns are enormous and have 
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Secondly, the Russian proposal has been addressed to Ankara, 
which has strengthened its position against Baku and Brussels. 
Turkey believes that it has become an important partner from 
Russia and the EU alike, which has an impact on its political and 
energy calculations. Ankara is behaving as the main player as 
regards gas issues in the region, for example, while negotiating 
gas supplies from Turkmenistan. The consequences of Turkey’s 
stronger assertiveness have been felt by Russia strongest of all 
as yet – Ankara, seeing Moscow’s determination to build Turkish 
Stream, has taken a tough stance while negotiating a reduction 
in gas prices19. However, it is conceivable that Ankara will soon 
present an equally tough stance in dealings with Azerbaijan or 
the EU. The Russian proposal has doubtlessly seriously affected 
Ankara’s calculations in the energy sector, because, even if it is 
imprecise, it has strongly increased Turkey’s chance of becoming 
a gas trade hub and has added to Ankara’s political weight. 
Thirdly, the idea of building Turkish Stream has affected the cal-
culations of those EU member states who are potential recipients 
of Azerbaijani gas from the Southern Gas Corridor and partici-
pants of the TAP project, i.e. the third European section of the cor-
ridor. This concerns above all Greece, which has been invited by 
been expressed partly through press reports outlining any difficulties linked 
to Turkish Stream and SOCAR’s assurances that TANAP cannot be stopped, 
cf. an interview with the deputy head of SOCAR: http://www.euractiv.com/
sections/energy/socar-it-impossible-stop-Southern-Gas-Corridor-314810
The issue of competition, in the case that the route’s transport capacity 
is increased, has been raised amongst others by the main manager of the 
company in charge of implementation of TANAP: http://www.azernews.az/
oil_and_gas/82686.html
19 When the idea of building the Turkish Stream gas pipeline was announced 
on 1 December 2014, the Russian president Vladimir Putin promised Tur-
key a 6-percent discount on gas prices. However, this offer was rejected by 
Ankara, which managed to obtain a discount of 10.5% (February 2014). Then 
Gazprom questioned the price component with regard to which the discount 
was to be applied, and the parties launched another round of negotiations. 
A gas price discount has already been offered to private importers: 
http://1prime.ru/energy/20150506/809600142.html 
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Russia to take part in the Turkish Stream project20. So far, due to 
the change in the economic situation and the victory of a more pro-
Russian Syriza political party in the election in Greece, Athens 
has made efforts to revise the previous arrangements concerning 
the construction of the TAP gas pipeline. Greece’s demands have 
been rejected by Azerbaijan. It can, nevertheless, be assumed that 
a further rapprochement between Athens and Moscow and Rus-
sia’s proposal to extend Turkish Stream to Greece will adversely 
affect the co-operation between Baku and Athens21. 
2. The EU’s interest in the Southern Gas Corridor  
– no implementation instruments 
Apart from the actions taken by Russia, the situation around the 
construction of the gas pipeline running from Azerbaijan to Tur-
key is additionally complicated by the European Commission’s 
intensified interest in the diversification of gas supplies and the 
higher significance granted to the Southern Gas Corridor. Para-
doxically, by granting strategic significance to the Southern Gas 
Corridor once again and recognising TANAP as its essential ele-
ment, the EU has turned it once more into a geopolitical instru-
ment of rivalry with Russia. This is true at least according to the 
Kremlin’s perception, which has traditionally made efforts to pre-
vent gas supplies from the post-Soviet area to the EU that would 
be independent of Russia. 
The EU views TANAP as the first step towards the fulfilment of 
far more ambitious plans to import natural gas from Central Asia, 
20 http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite2_1_07/05/2015_549808
21 An indirect proof for these concerns are the US appeals to Athens to with-
draw from Turkish Stream and become fully engaged in the construction of 
the Southern Gas Corridor: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/09/business/
international/greece-us-russia-energy-pipeline.html?_r=0
SOCAR has also difficulties finalising the transaction of purchase of a 66% 
stake in the Greek gas system operator DESFA due to resistance from the 
European Commission (the requirements of the third energy package) and 
the revision of Greece’s privatisation strategy: 
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and more precisely, Turkmenistan22 (cf. the provisions of the Eu-
ropean Commission’s communication on the Energy Union pub-
lished on 27 February 2015), and as a way to significantly reduce 
its dependence on gas supplies from Russia. The EU hopes that 
it will be able to increase the transport capacity of the Southern 
Gas Corridor’s infrastructure to 60 billion m3 and connect other 
countries to it, i.e. Turkmenistan and Iran (this means a return to 
the assumptions formulated in 2008). The EU’s vision is strongly 
at variance with the present shape of the infrastructure which is 
both planned and under construction, and is extremely unlikely 
to be put into practice, at least in the medium term. 
Given the lack of real possibilities for influencing the shape of the 
constructed and planned infrastructure of the Southern Gas Cor-
ridor (in its present variant), the European Commission’s moves 
have been limited so far to offering political support to the project: 
participation in the Southern Gas Corridor Advisory Board, vis-
its to Turkmenistan (2), Azerbaijan (2) and Turkey (1) by the vice 
president of the European Commission in charge of the Energy 
Union, and signing documents primarily of a declarative nature. 
Even though the European Commission has never before been so 
active, it still lacks the instruments which could give the EU a real 
influence on TANAP and, more broadly, on the Southern Gas Cor-
ridor. The instruments the EU has at its disposal have not under-
gone a qualitative change over the past few years and are insuf-
ficient to provide adequate support on the political and financial 
level to the corridor in the maximal form promoted by the EU. 
Western firms are also unlikely to become involved in the imple-
mentation of the Southern Gas Corridor, since, given the present 
situation on the gas market (i.e. hardly any demand and low gas 
22 See to the communication of the EU Commission on Energy Union pub-
lished on February 27, 2015, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/
TXT/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0080
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prices) and considering the way the geopolitical situation is devel-
oping, this would be a risky investment at the least. 
Regardless of this, it should be noted that the process of EU sup-
port for the infrastructure forming the Southern Gas Corridor 
has just begun, and its success will ultimately depend on the ef-
fectiveness of the instruments developed by the EU. Given the 
present geopolitical conditions and the fact that the West has lost 
its credibility in the post-Soviet area, these tools would have to be 
cross-sectoral and extend to the security, financial and political 
spheres, which is extremely difficult. 
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v. TaNap: THE ClaSH Of vISIONS Of BakU, 
BRUSSElS aND aNkaRa
Actions taken by the EU and Russia alike have made Azerbai-
jan’s situation more complicated. Baku’s intention is not to build 
a large supply route to the EU (for Turkmen or Iranian gas) but 
a gas pipeline for exporting Azerbaijani gas which at the same 
time would allow it to avoid competing with other suppliers. 
Azerbaijan would be ready to transform the Southern Gas Cor-
ridor into a transit route only over a long-term perspective. In 
Baku’s official narrative, supplies of gas other than Azerbaijani to 
TANAP will only be possible in the indefinite ‘future’23, while the 
EU hopes that such supplies could be possible as early as 201924. 
Azerbaijan has adopted a cautious stance on the EU’s activity – on 
the one hand it participates in the European Commission’s initia-
tives (for example, in the meeting in Ashgabat in May this year), 
hoping that this will make the EU more inclined to back the gas 
projects promoted by Baku, but on the other, it has made efforts to 
reduce the geopolitical significance of the Southern Gas Corridor. 
Having restricted the concept to the TANAP project (in 2012, after 
Nabucco was rejected), Baku has in fact limited the transport ca-
pacity of the Southern Gas Corridor and the possibilities of its be-
ing opened up to additional suppliers25. In turn, as regards TANAP 
23 http://report.az/en/energy/rovnag-abdullayev-tanap-will-be-one-of-the-
main-arteries-of-the-region/
24 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/05/02/uk-turkmenistan-gas-europe-
exclusive-idUKKBN0NN0FI20150502
25 Even though Azerbaijan is ready to accept supplies from other sources, it has 
not been lobbying for this. Symptomatic of this was the statement made by 
Azerbaijan’s ministerfor energy, Natig Aliyev, who said in June 2015 that gas 
supplies from Iran, Izrael and Cyprus to TANAP were possible, but this would 
require a number of political and infrastructural problems to be resolved and 
was at least uncertain, and at the same time he skipped the option of sup-
plies from Turkmenistan (which the EU is lobbying for). When asked whether 
Turkmenistan could participate in TANAP, Aliyev replied that this would be 
“irrelevant”. Cf. http://en.apa.az/xeber_minister__turkmenistan___s_ac-
quisition_sha_226999.html, http://abc.az/eng/news/88807.html
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itself, Azerbaijan has denied that it could compete with Russian 
gas in the EU market26. 
Azerbaijan does not make efforts to become engaged in co-opera-
tion with the EU, but it rather responds to the EU’s demand for nat-
ural gas above all in accordance with its own and not the EU’s inter-
est. The EU is viewed as a recipient of Azerbaijani gas. According 
to the stance adopted by Azerbaijan, its own vision and interests 
will determine the shape of the Southern Gas Corridor, and the EU 
will play just an auxiliary role. Thus Baku has insisted on the EU’s 
support in relations with Greece, expecting it to place pressure on 
Athens as regards the implementation of the TAP gas pipeline, and 
counts on the European Commission’s assistance in the process of 
privatisation of the Greek gas system operator (DESFA).
This fits in with the policy of avoiding provocation of Russia in the 
context of the developments in Ukraine. Baku, fearing Russia’s ag-
gressive reintegration initiatives in the post-Soviet area, has begun 
to adjust its policy more and more to the Kremlin’s expectations27. 
This is intended at protecting Azerbaijan from becoming another 
target of Russia’s aggressive policy and at the same time allowing 
it to implement its strategic goals in the energy sector, i.e. the con-
struction of the gas pipeline running to Turkey and the EU. 
A possible increase of the planned scale of gas supplies via the 
Southern Gas Corridor to 60 billion m3 would also aggravate the 
conflict of interest between Turkey, Azerbaijan and the EU. For 
Azerbaijan, this scenario would mean the need to compete with 
other gas suppliers in the European market, and this is something 
Baku has been trying to avoid so far by causing the break-off of 
26 http://report.az/en/energy/socar-competing-with-russia-for-gas-exports-
is-impossible/
27 Cf. Aleksandra Jarosiewicz, Azerbaijan – a growing problem for the West, 
OSW Commentary, 15 September 2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pub-
likacje/osw-commentary/2014-09-15/azerbaijan-a-growing-problem-west
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talks with Turkmenistan concerning the Trans-Caspian route28 
and pushing through TANAP, a project it is able to control. It is 
only a radical change in the region’s geopolitical order that might 
make Azerbaijan more interested in transforming TANAP into 
a transit route for third countries. 
The EU and Turkey are interested in increasing gas supplies to 
the European market or possibly also to the Turkish market to the 
maximum extent. Ankara’s strategic goal is to turn Turkey into 
a gas trading hub, which, in addition to legal changes, ownership 
transformation in BOTAS and investments in storage infrastruc-
ture29, requires above all an increased level of gas supplies to Tur-
key. As a result, Turkey wants more entities, and not just Azer-
baijan, to join the Southern Gas Corridor – hence the activation of 
Ankara’s efforts seen over the past few months to ensure supplies 
of Turkmen gas to TANAP and even attempts to take control over 
them30. Ankara’s moves go in line with the EU’s interests, which is 
also interested in receiving as much natural gas as possible from 
sources other than Russia. 
In turn, each of these variants in terms of supplies to the EU is con-
trary to Moscow’s interests. Moscow has been trying to maintain 
its dominant position as a gas supplier to the EU market, and is not 
interested in competing with Azerbaijani gas. Since the Nabucco 
28 Talks with Turkmenistan concerning the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline were 
broken off following an incident provoked by Azerbaijan on the Caspian Sea 
waters which are the subject of its territorial dispute with Turkmenistan. 
Cf. http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3650/rising-tension-between-
azerbaijan-and-turkmenistan-in-the-caspian.html
29 Cf. Gulmira Rzayeva, op. cit.
30 A framework contract between Turkmengaz and the private firm Atagas con-
cerning Turkmen gas sale was signed in November 2014 during the visit by 
the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Ashgabat. In turn, in March 
this year, the Turkish president announced that a Turkish-Azerbaijani-
Turkmen energy triangle would be formed. Atagas, and at least its CEO, is 
linked to Calik holding, whose head, Ahmed Calik, served as a minister in the 
Turkmen government under Niyzaov’s rule: http://www.borsamatik.com.tr/
haber-detay/eski-tpao-mudurunden-son-bomba/10881/
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project was given up, Russia has practically not mentioned the 
issue of Azerbaijani gas supplies to Europe and has mitigated its 
criticism of the Southern Gas Corridor. However, its attitude to 
this project has changed, one proof of which was the comment 
made by the Russian ambassador to the EU in March this year, 
who expressed doubts about the profitability and technical feasi-
bility of the TANAP project, and said that Russia wanted to use the 
transport capacity of the Trans-Adriatic route31. 
31 http://www.interfax.ru/interview/429339
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vI. CONClUSIONS
Even though the Southern Gas Corridor in its present version, which 
is restricted to the currently implemented TANAP project, will not 
solve the problem of guaranteeing energy security to the EU, and the 
EU has only modest means of influencing the shape of the project, 
paradoxically, its significance has grown. The project is currently oc-
cupying a more serious role due to the Ukrainian conflict and the cri-
sis in relations between the EU and Russia, which has affected their 
respective policies towards the Southern Gas Corridor and towards 
the actors engaged in its construction. The European Commission’s 
active engagement in issues linked to the Southern Gas Corridor 
proves that its political significance for the EU has grown. 
Meanwhile, even though Russia has been forced to withdraw from 
the South Stream gas pipeline project, it has replaced it with Turk-
ish Stream, and is thus trying to take the political initiative with 
regard to Turkey and Greece. By addressing the Turkish Stream 
project to the countries which are participating in projects as part 
of the Southern Gas Corridor, Russia is gaining a tool that can 
make their implementation more difficult. The implementation of 
the project has also been complicated due to the harsh economic 
situation in Greece, which on the one hand has stimulated Athens 
to bring ever new demands to the TAP consortium, but on the oth-
er has paralysed the operation of the government administration. 
In turn, Azerbaijan, even though it was able to transform the EU’s 
concept of the Southern Gas Corridor in 2012 into a project which 
serves its own interests and to take control of it, cannot be certain 
how this initiative will end. The changing circumstances have 
forced Baku to adopt a more flexible and cautious policy, so as not 
to provoke Russia. Azerbaijan, taking into account Ukraine’s expe-
rience, does not want to be viewed as the EU’s key ally in its plans to 
weaken Russia’s position on the EU gas market, and fears that Rus-
sia might make some moves that will complicate the implementa-
tion of the Southern Gas Corridor. The set of Russian measures (in 
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addition to Turkish Stream) includes the ability to destabilise the 
situation in Azerbaijan, for example, by fuelling conflict in the re-
gion of Nagorno-Karabakh. Given these fears, Baku may find it dif-
ficult to reject a possible Russian offer to use TANAP for transport-
ing Russian gas32 or to refuse Russia’s proposal to join the project. 
It cannot be ruled out that Russia might try to convince Azerbaijan 
to accept its participation in the TANAP project by offering to part-
ly resolve the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Beyond any doubt, the party which benefits from these changes 
is Turkey, which is becoming a highly desirable partner for both 
Russia and the EU. Ankara has made attempts to capitalise on 
the disagreements between these two entities to maximise the 
political and financial benefits it can derive from co-operation 
with each of the parties. Thus, Ankara’s activity in the energy 
sector, especially as regards the Southern Gas Corridor and Turk-
ish Stream, will be a reflection of the revision of its policy with 
regard to the EU, Russia and also Azerbaijan. One consequence of 
the emergence of Turkish Stream is certainly Turkey’s stronger 
position in relations with Azerbaijan. 
The Southern Gas Corridor, even though it is controlled by Azer-
baijan and not by any of the players involved in the crisis, is turn-
ing into an element of geopolitical rivalry. As a result, its future 
will depend not only on Baku’s determination but also on the fac-
tors generated by the changing context of its implementation. 
The components of this context will above all include relations 
between the EU and Russia, and Moscow’s policy towards each of 
the actors involved in the Southern Gas Corridor. 
alEkSaNDRa JaROSIEwICz
Work on this text was completed in June 2015
32 The proposal to resume Russian gas exports to Azerbaijan is quite interesting 
in this context (the statement of Gazprom’s head in June 2015) cf. http://en.apa.
az/xeber_alexei_miller__gazprom_is_ready_to_expor_228649.html).
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Map. Southern Gas Corridor
